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The validity of ecological studies in epidemiology for inferring causal relationships has been widely challenged as
observed associations could be biased by the Ecological Fallacy. We reconsider the important design components
of ecological studies, and discuss the conditions that may lead to spurious associations. Ecological associations are
useful and valid when the ecological exposures can be interpreted as Instrumental Variables. A suitable example
may be a time series analysis of environmental pollution (e.g. particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter
of <10 micrometres; PM10) and health outcomes (e.g. hospital admissions for acute myocardial infarction) as
environmental pollution levels are a cause of individual exposure levels and not just an aggregate measurement.
Ecological exposures may also be employed in situations (perhaps rare) where individual exposures are known but
their associations with health outcomes are confounded by unknown or unquantifiable factors. Ecological
associations have a notorious reputation in epidemiology and individualistic associations are considered superior to
ecological associations because of the “ecological fallacy”. We have argued that this is incorrect in situations in
which ecological or aggregate exposures can serve as an instrumental variable and associations between individual
exposure and outcome are likely to be confounded by unmeasured variables.
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individualismIntroduction
Ecological studies are epidemiological investigations in
which either the units of analysis are populations or
groups of people, as opposed to individuals, or expo-
sures are only known at the population level while out-
comes may be known at the individual level. Specifically,
ecological variables are properties of groups, organisa-
tions, or places, whereas individual-level variables are
properties of each person [1]. Generally, public and en-
vironmental health researchers utilise ecological study
designs to explore potential causal associations between
one or more exposures and a specific health outcome
when alternative study designs (e.g. case–control, cohort,
randomised controlled trial) are not possible or relevant.
For example, an ecologic study is the most appropriate
research design if we were interested in the effect of a
macro-level governmental policy change, such as an inner-
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article, unless otherwise stated.and improve air quality, on a particular aggregate health
outcome (e.g. number of consultations for childhood re-
spiratory disorders).Ecological fallacy
An ecological study design may also be utilised when the
underlying question regards individuals, such as when
one is interested in the effects of air quality on health. In
this context, ecological studies are potentially susceptible
to the “ecological fallacy”; biases that may occur when
an observed relationship between aggregated variables
differs from the true, i.e. causal, association at an indi-
vidual level [2]. Indeed, since Robinson in 1950 showed
that correlations on an individual level can differ mark-
edly from those on an aggregate, ecological level, epi-
demiological textbooks, papers and courses have warned
us about the dangers of this ecological fallacy [3,4].
Although ecological studies are still widely carried out,
this sceptical attitude towards ecological studies has led
to the “individualistic primacy”, i.e. the belief that associa-
tions on an individual level are intrinsically more truthful,d Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
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ecological level [5]. Public and environmental health prac-
titioners in particular tend to assume low level validity of
ecological studies. An additional reason for this scepticism
may be that the implicit objective of mainstream epi-
demiological research is the understanding of disease aeti-
ology, which is intrinsically an individualistic process. For
example, asbestos exposure in a neighbourhood can only
cause disease in individuals who were themselves exposed.
The supposed (ab)use of ecological associations has
even given rise to some occasional mockery (spoof ), for
instance by showing an association between Nobel prizes
awarded to a country, as a proxy for cognitive functioning,
and per capita chocolate consumption [6]. This rather
facetious example illustrates the potential weaknesses of
ecological studies. First, of course, there are many obvious
confounders that may explain the association between ag-
gregate chocolate consumption and the number of Nobel
prizes in a country, but also – more seriously, one can
doubt whether aggregate consumption can be considered
a good predictor or “cause” of individual chocolate con-
sumption (by the Nobel laureates). Although originally
formulated with nuance, the Simpson’s “paradox” which
has also become part of the canon of epidemiology, has
strengthened this attitude [7]. Simpson’s paradox (or the
Yule-Simpson effect) is a relationship between two vari-
ables that is observed in different groups of data that re-
verses when these groups are combined or aggregated.
That said, Rothman [8] posited that Simpson’s paradox is
not a ‘true’ paradox, rather the logical consequence of fail-
ing to recognise the presence of confounding variables. In
the above example, it might be that academics tend to
have the lowest chocolate consumption of all citizens, so
that within a country the association is the inverse of that
on a country level.
The concept of ecological fallacy, however, seems to
encompass several, different, potential biases, which may
explain why many authors seem to have difficulty pre-
cisely delineating this concept. One of these biases, as
explained above, is classical confounding, i.e. that eco-
logical, aggregated, units differ in more (unmeasured)
aspects than the (aggregate) exposure of interest, and
that these aspects may be related to the outcome. This
ecological confounding may also be caused by confound-
ing on an individual level (say by age or sex) when those
confounders cannot be measured or observed and their
distribution differs among ecological units. Another form
of bias is model specification bias, which can occur when
the relationship between individual exposure and outcome
is non-linear and the mean outcome and the outcome of
the mean exposure therefore differ [9]. The resulting dif-
ference between the expectation of an estimator from an
ecological study and the individual-level parameter of
interest is also known as ecological or cross-level bias. Ingeneral, this latter form of bias is unlikely to introduce as-
sociations that do not exist, but rather leads to biased esti-
mates in the correct direction of effects, which is often
less troubling than the possibility of introducing spurious
associations and thus qualitatively incorrect conclusions.
Tests for the null hypothesis of no associations are still
unbiased. The same is true for the apparent difference in
association that can occur due to the process of aggrega-
tion itself. The correlation between individual income and
health expenditure on an individual level and that of aver-
age income and average health expenditure on a munici-
pal level is bound to differ, either magnified or diluted,
even when the latter association is completely explained
by the former. In that case however, conclusions would
still hold qualitatively as the direction of the association
will be the same. As such, it is qualitative error, i.e. rever-
sion of the association direction due to aggregation, or the
introduction of spurious effects, that is often of greatest
concern in epidemiology and is the main issue we con-
sider in this paper.
Individualistic fallacy
Although this negative attitude towards ecological stud-
ies has been criticised for putting too much emphasis on
the individual as the unit for analysis [10], which even
led to the term “individualistic fallacy”, this has gained
much less attention in the epidemiological literature.
Some of this critique pointed at the intrinsic, conceptual
difference between variables on an individual and group
level [2]. For example, that in addition to personal pov-
erty (say) the poverty or deprivation of the society or
area in which one lives also matters. In addition, some
variables only exist, or make sense, at an aggregated or
societal level, such as whether one lives in a democracy
or not. In other contexts, societal level variables also ob-
viously impact relevantly on an individual’s risk. For ex-
ample, the risk of contracting a sexually transmitted
infection is not only determined by an individual’s risk
behaviour but also by the population prevalence of the
infection, which in turn is largely determined by “soci-
etal” factors such as the connectedness of sexual net-
works. While this criticism of the individual primacy is
correct, we feel that this critique overlooks some import-
ant points. Here we argue that even when the emphasis
is clearly on the individual, with the ultimate objective of
understanding the aetiology of disease, ecological ana-
lyses can be more “truthful” than individualistic analyses
and may avoid a large portion of confounding on the in-
dividual level.
Objectives
The aim of this paper is to extricate the confusion sur-
rounding ecological studies by re-evaluating the import-
ant design components and conditions that may lead to
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and informative for individual associations when the
ecological exposures can be interpreted as Instrumental
Variables (IV).
Instrumental variables
Public health epidemiology cannot lay claim to discover-
ing the utility of IV in ecological studies as the earliest
applications of “curve shifters” (variables with IV charac-
teristics) can be traced to the econometrics literature in
the 1930’s [11,12]. Indeed, PG Wright introduced IV’s
for estimating the elasticities of supply and demand for
flaxseed, the source of linseed oil [11,12]. For our re-
assessment of the value of ecological associations, we
point at the analogy between some ecological variables
and IV and posit that ecological analyses are useful and
meaningful when ecological variables can be interpreted
as an IV i.e. a variable that is correlated with, or preferably
a “cause of” the individual exposure, but whose association
with the outcome of interest is not itself confounded, at
least not by unmeasured variables (Figure 1). In addition,
the instrumental variable should only affect the outcome
via the individual exposure. That is, there should be no
causal pathways linking IV and outcome that bypass the
exposure. An epidemiological example where instrumental
variables have shown to be useful is that of “Mendelian
randomisation” (MR) [13]. For example, the blood pres-
sures of individuals with alcohol aldehyde dehydrogenase
deficiency mutations are compared to those without such
mutations, as “on average” carriers of this mutation drink
less than non-carriers [14]. Note that in this example, the
use of MR also obviates the need to measure individual al-
cohol consumption, something that in addition to poten-
tial confounding by behavioural variables is fraught with
methodological problems anyway [15]. However, MR has
also been fruitfully used to evaluate a causal effect of high-
density lipoprotein in blood on cardiovascular disease [16].
In addition, intention-to-treat analysis of a randomised
controlled trial is also essentially based on instrumentalC
OEIV
Figure 1 Markov graph showing the effects of individual
exposures (E) on their health outcome (O) in the context of
observational studies. Both E and O can be affected by other
variables, including (unknown) confounders (C). The existence of an
Instrumental variable (IV) makes it possible to establish a causal
relationship between E and O.variables, as when compliance is <100% random assign-
ment to treatment is not identical to actual treatment
received, but is not influenced by the potentially con-
founding factors that influence individual treatment
compliance.
Noteworthy is that intention-to-treat analysis does not
estimate the average causal effect among compliers and
is therefore subject to “dilution” bias i.e. a bias towards
the null due to misclassified exposure. Treatment alloca-
tion is typically a good instrumental variable when by
using blinding there are no causal links between the
randomisation arm and outcome that bypass actual
treatment. In the context of clinical trials, it has been
established that monotonicity is an essential requirement
of treatment assignment to be a good IV. Basically, in
the context of ecological studies, monotonicity means
that increases at the ecological level do not lead to de-
creases at the individual level. For example, suppose that
in heavily air polluted areas people stay indoors so often
in fact that they are less exposed to particulate matters
than individuals living in areas with less air pollution
then there is no monotonicity. Linearity is not required,
although non-linear relationships can be challenging in
the analysis [17,18]. In randomised controlled trial causal
analysis terminology, this means that there are no “de-
fiers” [19]. This idea can be simply extrapolated to other
IVs. In the case of MR and alcohol consumption for ex-
ample, monotonicity is plausible, as it is unlikely that
anyone without the aldehyde dehydrogenase deficiency
mutation would have had a higher weekly alcohol con-
sumption in the counterfactual situation in which he/she
carried the mutation. In the context of ecological associ-
ations, the IV idea can be easily translated to time series
investigations when over the period of varying ecological
exposure, such as air pollution or the introduction of
specific legislation, the population remains the same.
Monotonicity, however, could be violated if health warn-
ing about levels of environmental exposure would change
an individual’s behaviour.
An appealing feature of using an ecological IV is the
potential to answer research questions that may not be
possible using alternative observational research designs
at the individual level. For this reason, ecological studies
are also popular in studies where individual observations
are often hard to obtain [16]. For example, the introduc-
tion of a legal obligation to wear bicycle helmets has
been explored as an IV for a study on the impact of
wearing (bicycle) helmets on risk of injury. On an indi-
vidual level wearing helmets is probably confounded
with factors such as “carefulness” and “risk taking”.
However, a legal obligation to wear helmets is unlikely
to affect “carefulness” or other traffic behaviour but is an
independent reason for wearing such helmets. Although
the existence of defiers (people who stopped wearing
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be completely ruled out they are probably rare.
Robinson [20], specifically, employed an ecological
approach to explore the effectiveness of introducing a
mandatory bicycle helmet law in Australia on reducing
overall cyclist injury morbidity and mortality. Robinson
[20] utilised population level data for injured cyclist hos-
pital admissions and matched aggregate survey data on
helmet wearing rates pre-law, first year of law and sec-
ond year of law to argue that cycle helmets do not pro-
vide marked safety benefits for cyclists at the population
level. Despite large increases in (mandatory) helmet use
as a result of these helmet laws, the proportions of cy-
clists and pedestrians admitted to hospital for head in-
juries followed a similar, declining trend. As such,
Robinson [20] attributed the observed reduction in cy-
clists with head injuries to the implementation of other
major road safety initiatives at the same time such as the
enforcement of speed limits, drink-driving laws, treat-
ment of accident black spots, etc. Interestingly, the
greatest effect of introducing the cycle helmet law ap-
peared to discourage cycling as the pre- and post-law
surveys showed reductions in numbers of child cyclists
15 and 2.2 times greater than the increase in numbers of
children wearing helmets; an observation that would
seem to invalidate the condition that an IV should only
affect the outcome via the exposure of interest. As
another example, alcohol consumption has many, often
adverse, effects on health. However, on an individual
level alcohol consumption is associated with many other
behaviours, such as smoking and sexual risk taking, all
of which may act as confounders when causally related
to a health outcome of interest. Some interventions that
affect alcohol consumption, such as the “natural experi-
ment” of the 1920–1933 prohibition in the United States
of America (USA), may offer opportunities to bypass this
confounding and may thus act as instrumental variables.
However, for this to be valid it is essential that the popu-
lation could be considered (more or less) constant so
that the concepts of complier and defier make sense.
This latter condition would make long term time series
(years, decades) questionable.
In other ecological contexts this criterion of monoton-
icity may not be so simple to apply; for example, when
we compare regions A and B with different populations
and different ecological exposure levels X. Direct com-
parison of an outcome measure y between A and B may
not be appropriate as A and B may have different levels
of other factors C that causally influence y, and are
therefore confounders or effect modifiers. Another limi-
tation of IVs is that they only can be expected to say
something about the causal effect of individual expo-
sures xi on y if we assume that the relationship between
xi and y is monotonic. Thus, any exposure that has, say,a U-shaped relationship with outcome should preferably
not be the subject of ecological analysis.
Estimation
The existence of an ecological IV makes it possible to
establish causality of the association between exposure
and outcome, even when individual exposures are not
observed but the IV for each individual is known. How-
ever, this is only a qualitative conclusion. In addition, it
may also be desirable to estimate the strength of the
relationship between individual exposures and outcome.
When individual exposures are also measured this is
straightforward using either two-stage least squares of
residual insertion [21,22]. In other situations this can
be challenging especially in the context of non-linear
relationships.
Air pollution time series
One example in which an ecological variable would
seem to have proper IV characteristics is in the case of
time-varying air pollution, such as particulate matter
with an aerodynamic diameter of <10 micrometres; PM10.
In many places such concentrations vary considerably,
and often rapidly (within hours or days), over time. Al-
though measured average levels may not accurately reflect
individual exposures, it seems plausible that there exist
close correlations and that therefore the ecological associ-
ations can be used to study the association between air
pollution and (say) episodes of asthma exacerbation.
Plausible confounders, for instance temperature, are meas-
urable and can therefore be adjusted for. Also, since
largely the same individuals are observed during different
time periods, the concept of defier is easy to interpret, viz.
someone who has lower individual exposure during times
of high environmental levels. Of course, such studies
would seem less appropriate for outcomes that are the re-
sult of chronic cumulative exposures e.g. cardiopulmonary-
or cancer-related mortality such as in the American
Cancer Society Study [23].
Geographical comparisons
More difficult is the ecological comparison between geo-
graphical areas, for example two areas with largely dif-
ferent air pollution levels (e.g. rural agricultural region
versus an urban industrial zone). As the two populations
are different, the concept of “defier” only has a counter-
factual interpretation, viz. as someone, if he had hap-
pened to have resided in the area with the higher
pollution levels would – personally, have lower exposure
to air pollution (or vice versa). Such (counterfactual) in-
dividuals are probably rare if the areas are similar in
other (relevant) aspects. However, this may not always
be the case. Individuals with asthma, for example, may
choose not to live in areas with high air pollution levels
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assess whether geographically defined environmental
exposures have IV properties but this has to be assessed
on the basis of substantive knowledge. Mean individual
exposures may sometimes be plausible as IVs but some-
times not.
Poverty and health
A similar situation may exist in the widely discussed re-
lationship between “wealth”, “poverty”, “social economic
status”, “employment status” and various (health) out-
comes. On an individual level, there may be a strong
relationship between unemployment, say, and (poor)
health and mortality, suggesting that unemployment is
causally related to adverse health outcomes. However, in
addition to selection biases, this relationship may be
confounded by many variables, which may make a causal
interpretation questionable. The unemployed individuals
may have lost their jobs due to poorer physical and/or
mental health or may be less socially adaptable. An eco-
nomic crisis or depression with rapid massive increases
in unemployment may act as an IV, and if (specific) mor-
tality or morbidity does not increase during such depres-
sions then one may question causal interpretations of
associations on an individualistic level. Again, since
largely the same individuals are involved, it is (at least
conceptually) easy to assess whether there are (signifi-
cant numbers of ) defiers, specifically people who eco-
nomically benefit (or find employment) during times of
depression. Although such individuals may exist, they
are probably rare. Economic depressions may also po-
tentially affect health through pathways not involving
unemployment. For example, during depressions the
(still) employed may avoid behaviours that would put
their employment in jeopardy. Although these alternate
causal pathways could potentially invalidate the value of
depressions as an IV their importance would seem
minor. Similarly, natural disasters or other “natural ex-
periments” may similarly occasionally provide good
instrumental variables. A case in point is the widely
accepted association between tuberculosis and poverty
[24-27]; while almost all cross-sectional studies show
this association the rapid increase in poverty in the USA
and Europe during the 1930’s did not give rise to
increases in tuberculosis mortality [28].
As a further example of the use of IV in intervention,
rather than observational, studies, we consider the asso-
ciation between regional sex worker interventions and
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevalence in
India. This is to illustrate situations in which ecological
(geographical) levels of a variable may have suitable IV
characteristics. In the four high HIV-prevalence states
(Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu)
of Southern India interventions targeting sex workers (e.g.condom use, sexually transmitted disease treatment) are
implemented on a district level. Effects of the interven-
tions on district-level HIV prevalence and incidence are
also measured on a district level by the district-specific
HIV prevalence in young (<25 years) ante-natal care at-
tendees. The idea behind these interventions is that pre-
vention of transmission (by safer sex practices) between
sex workers and their clients would reduce overall HIV
transmission. These interventions received strong support
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the form
of the “Avahan” project [29]. The existence of defiers, i.e.
people with a lower risk of HIV infection in the absence of
an intervention, is unlikely, thus monotonicity seems
plausible. So in principle, intervention at a district level
could be a good IV.
Conclusion
Researchers should be reminded that no perfect epi-
demiological study exists and all research designs have
both strengths and weaknesses. Hence, the selection of
an appropriate research design requires deep consider-
ation of the design components, research question and
ability to estimate or quantify important exposure vari-
ables related to the outcome of interest. While ecological
associations have an infamous reputation in epidemiology
and differences between individualistic and ecological as-
sociations are often attributed to the “ecological fallacy”
we have argued that this is incorrect in situations in which
ecological or aggregate exposures can serve as an instru-
mental variable and associations between individual ex-
posure and outcome are likely to be confounded by
unmeasured variables. Thus, instrumental variables, and
by consequence some ecological studies, have the advan-
tage of reducing bias. We believe that this paper delineates
situations in which ecological associations may provide re-
liable causal interpretations and thus provides a yardstick
for assessing whether the ecological fallacy can be ex-
pected. For assessment of whether a causal relationship
exists, neither individual studies, nor ecological (IV) stud-
ies by themselves suffice. Even experimental studies, often
inadequately mimicking “wild type” exposures, do not suf-
fice. Deep conclusions often require synthesis of evidence
of different kinds [30]. It is our opinion that proper
ecological studies can contribute to this evidence.
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